Tenants all the way down

// DECISION (chapter 2.1): the SAD's environments table references
// applications(id) but never defines the table. This stub satisfies the
// foreign key; the real application lifecycle belongs to Part 3's tenancy
// chapters.

@@ -24,13 +24,87 @@
 // (ADR-06's chapter), emoji/media tables (their parts), messages
 // partitioning (SAD growth note -> retention chapter).
 
-// DECISION (chapter 2.1): the SAD's environments table references
-// applications(id) but never defines the table. This stub satisfies the
-// foreign key; the real application lifecycle belongs to Part 3's tenancy
-// chapters.
+// The tenancy hierarchy (chapter 3.1). Everything from here to `members`
+// below sits ABOVE the environment boundary: these rows say who owns a
+// platform account, and they are the only tables in this file without an
+// environment_id. Everything below the boundary carries one and is scoped by
+// the repository (constitution I).
+//
+// DECISION (chapter 3.1): SAD §6.1 defines `environments` and everything under
+// it, but never defines the containers above — the gap 2.1 papered over with a
+// one-column `applications` stub. These three tables are derived from the SRS
+// (FR-TEN-01/02/03/04/07), not quoted from the SAD, and that is why they carry
+// this note.
+export const organisations = pgTable("organisations", {
+  id: uuid("id").primaryKey(),
+  name: text("name").notNull(),
+  createdAt: timestamp("created_at", { withTimezone: true })
+    .notNull()
+    .defaultNow(),
+});
+
+// A person who signs in to Relay. NOT the `users` table below — see ADR-18.
+// Identity is the provider account, never the email: emails change hands, and
+// a provider may not release one at all (hence nullable).
+export const humans = pgTable(
+  "humans",
+  {
+    id: uuid("id").primaryKey(),
+    provider: text("provider").notNull(),
+    providerAccountId: text("provider_account_id").notNull(),
+    displayName: text("display_name"),
+    email: text("email"),
+    createdAt: timestamp("created_at", { withTimezone: true })
+      .notNull()
+      .defaultNow(),
+  },
+  (t) => [
+    // Signup idempotency, decided by the index rather than by a read-then-
+    // write check that loses to a concurrent second click (2.3's lesson).
+    unique("humans_provider_account_unique").on(
+      t.provider,
+      t.providerAccountId,
+    ),
+    check("humans_provider_check", sql`${t.provider} IN ('github','google')`),
+  ],
+);
+
+export const memberships = pgTable(
+  "memberships",
+  {
+    organisationId: uuid("organisation_id")
+      .notNull()
+      .references(() => organisations.id),
+    humanId: uuid("human_id")
+      .notNull()
+      .references(() => humans.id),
+    role: text("role").notNull(),
+    joinedAt: timestamp("joined_at", { withTimezone: true })
+      .notNull()
+      .defaultNow(),
+  },
+  (t) => [
+    primaryKey({ columns: [t.organisationId, t.humanId] }),
+    check(
+      "memberships_role_check",
+      sql`${t.role} IN ('owner','admin','member')`,
+    ), // FR-TEN-07
+  ],
+);
+
+// Replaces chapter 2.1's stub: an application now knows who owns it
+// (FR-TEN-03). Deletion (FR-TEN-08) needs machinery this chapter does not
+// build, so no cascade is declared — a cascade would imply a deletion story
+// that does not exist yet.
 export const applications = pgTable("applications", {
   id: uuid("id").primaryKey(),
+  organisationId: uuid("organisation_id")
+    .notNull()
+    .references(() => organisations.id),
   name: text("name").notNull(),
+  createdAt: timestamp("created_at", { withTimezone: true })
+    .notNull()
+    .defaultNow(),
 });
 
 export const environments = pgTable(
@@ -51,6 +125,10 @@
       "environments_kind_check",
       sql`${t.kind} IN ('development','production')`,
     ),
+    // FR-TEN-04 says exactly two environments per application. With the CHECK
+    // above, this unique index IS that rule: two legal kinds, one row each.
+    // No trigger, no counting query, nothing to lose a race to.
+    unique("environments_application_kind_unique").on(t.applicationId, t.kind),
   ],
 );
 

ALTER TABLE "applications" ADD COLUMN "organisation_id" uuid NOT NULL;

-- Chapter 3.1 — the tenancy hierarchy (FR-TEN-01/02/03/04/07).
--
-- REVIEW DISPOSITION: drizzle-kit generated this file from schema.ts and it
-- was reviewed before being applied (the ADR-16 workflow). One statement was
-- rewritten by hand:
--
--   generated:  ALTER TABLE "applications" ADD COLUMN "organisation_id" uuid NOT NULL;
--
-- That fails on any database that already has application rows — which every
-- reader's does, because chapter 2.1's createEnvironment has been minting them
-- since Part 2. A NOT NULL column cannot appear on a populated table without
-- saying what the existing rows should hold. Replaced by the three-step shape
-- below: add nullable, backfill, then constrain.
--
-- The backfill gives every orphaned application its own organisation and
-- reuses the application's uuid as the organisation's, so the lineage stays
-- readable afterwards: an organisation whose id matches an application is one
-- this migration invented.
 
CREATE TABLE "humans" (
	"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
	"provider" text NOT NULL,
	"provider_account_id" text NOT NULL,
	"display_name" text,
	"email" text,
	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
	CONSTRAINT "humans_provider_account_unique" UNIQUE("provider","provider_account_id"),
	CONSTRAINT "humans_provider_check" CHECK ("humans"."provider" IN ('github','google'))
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "memberships" (
	"organisation_id" uuid NOT NULL,
	"human_id" uuid NOT NULL,
	"role" text NOT NULL,
	"joined_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
	CONSTRAINT "memberships_organisation_id_human_id_pk" PRIMARY KEY("organisation_id","human_id"),
	CONSTRAINT "memberships_role_check" CHECK ("memberships"."role" IN ('owner','admin','member'))
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "organisations" (
	"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
	"name" text NOT NULL,
	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL
);
--> statement-breakpoint
-- 1. add it nullable, so the column can exist alongside the rows that predate it
ALTER TABLE "applications" ADD COLUMN "organisation_id" uuid;--> statement-breakpoint
-- 2. backfill: one organisation per orphan, id carried across for traceability
INSERT INTO "organisations" ("id", "name")
SELECT a."id", 'migrated: ' || a."name" FROM "applications" a WHERE a."organisation_id" IS NULL;--> statement-breakpoint
UPDATE "applications" SET "organisation_id" = "id" WHERE "organisation_id" IS NULL;--> statement-breakpoint
-- 3. and only now is the constraint true of every row
ALTER TABLE "applications" ALTER COLUMN "organisation_id" SET NOT NULL;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "applications" ADD COLUMN "created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "memberships" ADD CONSTRAINT "memberships_organisation_id_organisations_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("organisation_id") REFERENCES "public"."organisations"("id") ON DELETE no action ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "memberships" ADD CONSTRAINT "memberships_human_id_humans_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("human_id") REFERENCES "public"."humans"("id") ON DELETE no action ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "applications" ADD CONSTRAINT "applications_organisation_id_organisations_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("organisation_id") REFERENCES "public"."organisations"("id") ON DELETE no action ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "environments" ADD CONSTRAINT "environments_application_kind_unique" UNIQUE("application_id","kind");

@@ -3,15 +3,25 @@
 import { and, asc, desc, eq, gt, lt, sql, type SQL } from "drizzle-orm";
 
 import type { Db } from "./client";
-import { channels, members, messages, users } from "./schema";
+import {
+  applications,
+  channels,
+  environments,
+  humans,
+  members,
+  memberships,
+  messages,
+  organisations,
+  users,
+} from "./schema";
 
 // The repository layer — the ONE place data access lives (ADR-04's single
 // writer, constitution I). Two surfaces with a bright line between them:
 //
-//   createEnvironment — the ADMIN surface. It creates tenants, so it is the
-//   only operation here that is not tenant-scoped. It also inserts a stub
-//   application row to satisfy environments' NOT NULL foreign key (recorded
-//   decision: the real application lifecycle belongs to Part 3).
+//   createEnvironment / provisionOrganisation — the ADMIN surface. These
+//   create tenants, so they are the only operations here that are not
+//   tenant-scoped. As of chapter 3.1 they build the whole container stack:
+//   organisation -> application -> environment, with no stubs left.
 //
 //   Repository — everything else. The constructor REQUIRES an
 //   environment_id; every query is scoped by it HERE, in one home — never
@@ -34,18 +44,199 @@
   db: Db,
   { name, kind = "development" }: { name: string; kind?: Environment["kind"] },
 ): Promise<Environment> {
+  const organisationId = randomUUID();
   const applicationId = randomUUID();
   const environmentId = randomUUID();
   // The admin surface writes through the same Db handle but carries no
   // tenant scope — it is the operation that MINTS the scope.
+  //
+  // Chapter 3.1 added the organisation above the application, and this
+  // function had to grow with it the same day: `applications.organisation_id`
+  // is NOT NULL, and this is the function every Part 2 suite, the e2e harness
+  // and three walk scripts use to make a tenant. A schema change whose only
+  // writer is left behind is not a migration, it is an outage.
   await db.execute(
-    sql`INSERT INTO applications (id, name) VALUES (${applicationId}, ${name})`,
+    sql`INSERT INTO organisations (id, name) VALUES (${organisationId}, ${name})`,
+  );
+  await db.execute(
+    sql`INSERT INTO applications (id, organisation_id, name)
+        VALUES (${applicationId}, ${organisationId}, ${name})`,
   );
   await db.execute(
     sql`INSERT INTO environments (id, application_id, kind, signing_secret)
         VALUES (${environmentId}, ${applicationId}, ${kind}, ${randomUUID()})`,
   );
   return { id: environmentId, kind };
+}
+
+/** What a signup produced — or found. `created` answers "was an organisation
+ * created on this call?", NOT "was the identity new": a known human who owned
+ * nothing gets `created: true`, because one really was created for them. */
+export interface Provisioned {
+  organisation: { id: string; name: string };
+  application: { id: string; name: string };
+  environment: { id: string; kind: Environment["kind"] };
+  human: { id: string; provider: string; provider_account_id: string };
+  created: boolean;
+}
+
+/** Signup (chapter 3.1, FR-TEN-01/02). The admin surface's second entrance:
+ * it mints a tenant, so like createEnvironment it carries no tenant scope —
+ * it is the operation that creates one.
+ *
+ * ATOMIC: one transaction. A half-built tenant — an application with no
+ * environment — is unusable and invisible to the person who just signed up,
+ * so there is no state between "nothing" and "everything".
+ *
+ * IDEMPOTENT ON THE OWNED ORGANISATION, which is the only rule that is defined
+ * for every reachable case:
+ *
+ *   unknown identity           -> five rows; created: true
+ *   known, owns an org         -> that org; nothing written; created: false
+ *   known, owns none           -> four rows (no new human); created: true
+ *
+ * The third case cannot happen until invitations exist, and the rule is stated
+ * now because "return the existing organisation" is undefined for a human who
+ * only belongs to someone ELSE's — a state FR-TEN-07 makes legal the moment
+ * membership management arrives. Signing up gives you your own workspace; it
+ * never hands you somebody else's.
+ */
+export async function provisionOrganisation(
+  db: Db,
+  {
+    provider,
+    providerAccountId,
+    displayName,
+    email,
+    organisationName,
+  }: {
+    provider: string;
+    providerAccountId: string;
+    displayName?: string | null;
+    email?: string | null;
+    organisationName: string;
+  },
+): Promise<Provisioned> {
+  return db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+    // The identity, or the row that already speaks for it. The unique index on
+    // (provider, provider_account_id) is what decides under concurrency — a
+    // read-then-write check here would let two simultaneous first clicks both
+    // believe they were first (2.3's lesson, on a different table).
+    const [existingHuman] = await tx
+      .select({
+        id: humans.id,
+        provider: humans.provider,
+        provider_account_id: humans.providerAccountId,
+      })
+      .from(humans)
+      .where(
+        and(
+          eq(humans.provider, provider),
+          eq(humans.providerAccountId, providerAccountId),
+        ),
+      );
+
+    if (existingHuman) {
+      // Does this identity already OWN an organisation? Membership is not
+      // ownership: being a member of someone else's does not count.
+      const [owned] = await tx
+        .select({
+          id: organisations.id,
+          name: organisations.name,
+        })
+        .from(memberships)
+        .innerJoin(
+          organisations,
+          eq(organisations.id, memberships.organisationId),
+        )
+        .where(
+          and(
+            eq(memberships.humanId, existingHuman.id),
+            eq(memberships.role, "owner"),
+          ),
+        )
+        .orderBy(asc(memberships.joinedAt))
+        .limit(1);
+
+      if (owned) {
+        const [application] = await tx
+          .select({ id: applications.id, name: applications.name })
+          .from(applications)
+          .where(eq(applications.organisationId, owned.id))
+          .orderBy(asc(applications.createdAt))
+          .limit(1);
+        const [environment] = await tx
+          .select({
+            id: environments.id,
+            kind: sql<Environment["kind"]>`${environments.kind}`,
+          })
+          .from(environments)
+          .where(eq(environments.applicationId, application!.id))
+          .orderBy(asc(environments.kind))
+          .limit(1);
+        return {
+          organisation: owned,
+          application: application!,
+          environment: environment!,
+          human: existingHuman,
+          created: false,
+        };
+      }
+    }
+
+    const human =
+      existingHuman ??
+      (
+        await tx
+          .insert(humans)
+          .values({
+            id: randomUUID(),
+            provider,
+            providerAccountId,
+            displayName: displayName ?? null,
+            email: email ?? null,
+          })
+          .returning({
+            id: humans.id,
+            provider: humans.provider,
+            provider_account_id: humans.providerAccountId,
+          })
+      )[0]!;
+
+    const organisationId = randomUUID();
+    const applicationId = randomUUID();
+    const environmentId = randomUUID();
+
+    await tx
+      .insert(organisations)
+      .values({ id: organisationId, name: organisationName });
+    await tx.insert(applications).values({
+      id: applicationId,
+      organisationId,
+      name: organisationName,
+    });
+    await tx.insert(environments).values({
+      id: environmentId,
+      applicationId,
+      // FR-TEN-02: development, and only development. The production
+      // environment is possible (FR-TEN-04) but not automatic.
+      kind: "development",
+      signingSecret: randomUUID(),
+    });
+    await tx.insert(memberships).values({
+      organisationId,
+      humanId: human.id,
+      role: "owner", // FR-TEN-07's vocabulary; management of it is later
+    });
+
+    return {
+      organisation: { id: organisationId, name: organisationName },
+      application: { id: applicationId, name: organisationName },
+      environment: { id: environmentId, kind: "development" as const },
+      human,
+      created: true,
+    };
+  });
 }
 
 export interface UserRow {

import { z } from "zod";
 
// What a provider is allowed to say back (chapter 3.1). Two responses cross
// this boundary — the token exchange and the profile fetch — and both are
// parsed, not assumed.
//
// The habit is 1.3's and it has paid every time since: an unvalidated payload
// does not fail where it arrives, it fails three layers away as an `undefined`
// somebody has to trace back. Here the stakes are higher than usual, because
// the thing being parsed decides who a person is.
 
/** GitHub answers a failed exchange with HTTP 200 and an error body. Parsing
 * only the success shape would read `access_token: undefined` as a token. */
export const providerErrorSchema = z.object({
  error: z.string().min(1),
  error_description: z.string().optional(),
});
 
export const tokenResponseSchema = z.object({
  access_token: z.string().min(1),
  token_type: z.string().optional(),
  scope: z.string().optional(),
});
 
/** The profile, narrowed to what signup is allowed to want. FR-TEN-01 says
 * "providing no information beyond that granted by the provider" — so this
 * takes an id, a name if there is one, an email if the provider released one,
 * and nothing else. `id` arrives as a number from GitHub and a string from
 * Google; both become a string, because it is an opaque key here. */
export const profileSchema = z.object({
  id: z.union([z.string().min(1), z.number().int()]).transform(String),
  login: z.string().min(1).optional(),
  name: z.string().min(1).nullish(),
  email: z.string().email().nullish(),
});
 
export type TokenResponse = z.infer<typeof tokenResponseSchema>;
export type Profile = z.infer<typeof profileSchema>;

import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
 
// The CSRF binding for the OAuth flow (chapter 3.1).
//
// `state` exists to prove that the callback belongs to the browser that
// started the flow. A signed-but-stateless state proves the SERVER minted it
// and nothing more — an attacker can start a flow, take the state, and feed
// the victim a callback URL that still verifies. Binding needs something only
// that browser holds, which is a cookie. Five lines of header parsing, and no
// dependency for it.
 
export const STATE_COOKIE = "relay_oauth_state";
const MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 600;
 
export function mintState(): string {
  return randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
}
 
/** `Path=/auth` keeps it off every other request; `SameSite=Lax` still allows
 * the provider's top-level redirect back; `HttpOnly` keeps script away from
 * it. `Secure` is omitted only when the base URL is plain http, which is the
 * local case — a reader on localhost would otherwise never receive it. */
export function stateCookie(value: string, secure: boolean): string {
  const parts = [
    `${STATE_COOKIE}=${value}`,
    "HttpOnly",
    "SameSite=Lax",
    "Path=/auth",
    `Max-Age=${value === "" ? 0 : MAX_AGE_SECONDS}`,
  ];
  if (secure) parts.push("Secure");
  return parts.join("; ");
}
 
export function clearStateCookie(secure: boolean): string {
  return stateCookie("", secure);
}
 
/** Read one cookie out of a raw header. No parser dependency: the format is
 * `a=1; b=2`, and anything that does not match that is not a cookie we set. */
export function readCookie(
  header: string | undefined,
  name: string,
): string | undefined {
  if (!header) return undefined;
  for (const pair of header.split(";")) {
    const eq = pair.indexOf("=");
    if (eq < 0) continue;
    if (pair.slice(0, eq).trim() === name) return pair.slice(eq + 1).trim();
  }
  return undefined;
}
 
/** Constant-time comparison. The state is not a secret in the way a password
 * is, but it is compared on every callback and the cost of doing it properly
 * is one function call. */
export function statesMatch(
  fromQuery: string | undefined,
  fromCookie: string | undefined,
): boolean {
  if (!fromQuery || !fromCookie) return false;
  const a = Buffer.from(fromQuery);
  const b = Buffer.from(fromCookie);
  if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
  return timingSafeEqual(a, b);
}

import {
  profileSchema,
  providerErrorSchema,
  tokenResponseSchema,
  type Profile,
} from "./oauth.schema";
 
// The authorization-code flow, by hand (chapter 3.1).
//
// No Passport, no strategy plugin. The flow is three steps and this chapter
// exists to teach them; a library would hide exactly the part the reader came
// for, and would add two dependencies to a service whose constitution says
// boring by design. Chapter 2.5 wired the WebSocket upgrade by hand for the
// same reason.
//
// Endpoints are configuration, not constants. That is what lets the test lane
// point at a local stand-in and stay offline and deterministic (2.1's
// two-lane gate, 2.8's no-flakes rule) — and it is also what a real
// deployment needs for GitHub Enterprise.
 
export class ProviderError extends Error {
  constructor(
    message: string,
    readonly kind: "denied" | "unusable",
  ) {
    super(message);
    this.name = "ProviderError";
  }
}
 
export interface ProviderConfig {
  clientId: string;
  clientSecret: string;
  authorizeUrl: string;
  tokenUrl: string;
  userUrl: string;
  scope: string;
}
 
const GITHUB_DEFAULTS = {
  authorizeUrl: "https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize",
  tokenUrl: "https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token",
  userUrl: "https://api.github.com/user",
  scope: "read:user user:email",
};
 
/** Configuration for a provider, or undefined when it is not set up. An
 * unconfigured provider is a 404 rather than a redirect into a broken flow. */
export function providerConfig(name: string): ProviderConfig | undefined {
  if (name !== "github") return undefined;
  const clientId = process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID;
  const clientSecret = process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET;
  if (!clientId || !clientSecret) return undefined;
  return {
    clientId,
    clientSecret,
    authorizeUrl:
      process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_AUTHORIZE_URL ??
      GITHUB_DEFAULTS.authorizeUrl,
    tokenUrl:
      process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_TOKEN_URL ?? GITHUB_DEFAULTS.tokenUrl,
    userUrl: process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_USER_URL ?? GITHUB_DEFAULTS.userUrl,
    scope: GITHUB_DEFAULTS.scope,
  };
}
 
export function redirectUri(provider: string): string {
  const base = process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE ?? "http://localhost:4000";
  return `${base}/auth/${provider}/callback`;
}
 
/** Step one: where to send the browser. */
export function authorizeUrl(
  provider: string,
  config: ProviderConfig,
  state: string,
): string {
  const url = new URL(config.authorizeUrl);
  url.searchParams.set("client_id", config.clientId);
  url.searchParams.set("redirect_uri", redirectUri(provider));
  url.searchParams.set("scope", config.scope);
  url.searchParams.set("state", state);
  return url.toString();
}
 
/** Steps two and three: trade the code for a token, then ask who it belongs
 * to. Both responses are parsed; neither is trusted for its shape. */
export async function exchangeCodeForProfile(
  provider: string,
  config: ProviderConfig,
  code: string,
): Promise<Profile> {
  const tokenRes = await fetch(config.tokenUrl, {
    method: "POST",
    headers: { accept: "application/json", "content-type": "application/json" },
    body: JSON.stringify({
      client_id: config.clientId,
      client_secret: config.clientSecret,
      code,
      redirect_uri: redirectUri(provider),
    }),
  });
  if (!tokenRes.ok) {
    throw new ProviderError(
      `token endpoint answered ${tokenRes.status}`,
      "unusable",
    );
  }
  const tokenBody: unknown = await tokenRes.json();
 
  // The provider's own refusal is a 400 to our caller, not a 502: nothing is
  // broken, the person declined or the code expired.
  const denied = providerErrorSchema.safeParse(tokenBody);
  if (denied.success) {
    throw new ProviderError(denied.data.error, "denied");
  }
  const token = tokenResponseSchema.safeParse(tokenBody);
  if (!token.success) {
    throw new ProviderError(
      "token response did not match the contract",
      "unusable",
    );
  }
 
  const userRes = await fetch(config.userUrl, {
    headers: {
      accept: "application/json",
      authorization: `Bearer ${token.data.access_token}`,
      // GitHub rejects requests without one.
      "user-agent": "relay",
    },
  });
  if (!userRes.ok) {
    throw new ProviderError(
      `user endpoint answered ${userRes.status}`,
      "unusable",
    );
  }
  const profile = profileSchema.safeParse(await userRes.json());
  if (!profile.success) {
    throw new ProviderError("profile did not match the contract", "unusable");
  }
  return profile.data;
}

import {
  BadGatewayException,
  BadRequestException,
  Controller,
  Get,
  Headers,
  NotFoundException,
  Param,
  Query,
  Res,
} from "@nestjs/common";
import { createDb, createPool } from "../db/client";
import { provisionOrganisation } from "../db/repository";
import {
  authorizeUrl,
  exchangeCodeForProfile,
  providerConfig,
  ProviderError,
} from "./oauth.provider";
import {
  STATE_COOKIE,
  clearStateCookie,
  mintState,
  readCookie,
  stateCookie,
  statesMatch,
} from "./state-cookie";
 
// Signup (chapter 3.1, FR-TEN-01/02). Two routes, both necessarily
// unauthenticated: they exist to establish who somebody is, and no tenant
// exists yet for a header to name. Note what is absent — the
// EnvironmentContextGuard every other controller carries (2.2). The guard is
// applied per controller, so a pre-tenant route simply does not use it, and
// the seam it guards is untouched by this chapter (3.2 retires it).
//
// What these routes do NOT do: issue a session. A session is a credential,
// credentials are 3.2's subject, and the dashboard that would consume one is
// Part 5. The callback reports what it created and stops there.
 
/** The two things this controller needs from the response object.
 *
 * `@Res()` puts a handler in Nest's library-specific mode, which normally
 * means importing express's `Response` type — and express 5 ships no types, so
 * that would mean adding `@types/express` for two method signatures. Declaring
 * the shape instead keeps the api's dependency list exactly where 1.4 left it,
 * and states plainly what these routes actually touch. */
interface HttpResponse {
  setHeader(name: string, value: string): void;
  redirect(status: number, url: string): void;
}
 
const db = createDb(createPool());
 
@Controller("auth")
export class SignupController {
  @Get(":provider/start")
  start(@Param("provider") provider: string, @Res() res: HttpResponse): void {
    const config = providerConfig(provider);
    // An unconfigured or unknown provider is a 404 — never a redirect built
    // from unvalidated input.
    if (!config) throw new NotFoundException("unknown provider");
 
    const state = mintState();
    const secure = !(
      process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE ?? "http://localhost:4000"
    ).startsWith("http://");
    res.setHeader("set-cookie", stateCookie(state, secure));
    res.redirect(302, authorizeUrl(provider, config, state));
  }
 
  @Get(":provider/callback")
  async callback(
    @Param("provider") provider: string,
    @Query("code") code: string | undefined,
    @Query("state") state: string | undefined,
    @Query("error") providerError: string | undefined,
    @Headers("cookie") cookieHeader: string | undefined,
    @Res({ passthrough: true }) res: HttpResponse,
  ) {
    const config = providerConfig(provider);
    if (!config) throw new NotFoundException("unknown provider");
 
    const secure = !(
      process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE ?? "http://localhost:4000"
    ).startsWith("http://");
 
    // THE BINDING IS CHECKED FIRST, before anything else is even read. An
    // unverified callback must never make this server talk to the provider on
    // an attacker's behalf — and a state that merely validates as
    // well-formed proves nothing about WHICH browser began the flow.
    const expected = readCookie(cookieHeader, STATE_COOKIE);
    if (!statesMatch(state, expected)) {
      res.setHeader("set-cookie", clearStateCookie(secure));
      throw new BadRequestException("state does not match");
    }
    res.setHeader("set-cookie", clearStateCookie(secure));
 
    if (providerError) throw new BadRequestException(providerError);
    if (!code) throw new BadRequestException("missing code");
 
    let profile;
    try {
      profile = await exchangeCodeForProfile(provider, config, code);
    } catch (error) {
      if (error instanceof ProviderError) {
        // The person declining is a 400 — nothing is broken. A provider that
        // answers something the contract does not allow is a 502: the fault
        // is upstream, and saying "bad request" would blame the caller.
        throw error.kind === "denied"
          ? new BadRequestException(error.message)
          : new BadGatewayException(error.message);
      }
      throw error;
    }
 
    const result = await provisionOrganisation(db, {
      provider,
      providerAccountId: profile.id,
      displayName: profile.name ?? profile.login ?? null,
      email: profile.email ?? null,
      // No form to fill in (FR-TEN-01): the name comes from what the provider
      // granted, and nothing else is asked for.
      organisationName: `${profile.login ?? profile.name ?? "relay"}'s org`,
    });
 
    return {
      organisation: result.organisation,
      application: result.application,
      environment: result.environment,
      created: result.created,
    };
  }
}

import { Module } from "@nestjs/common";
 
import { SignupController } from "./signup.controller";
 
// Signup's home (chapter 3.1). Deliberately thin, and deliberately NOT
// importing MessagesModule: nothing here is tenant-scoped, so it needs none of
// the request-scoped machinery 2.2 built. The provisioning it calls lives in
// the repository's admin surface, which is a module-free function for exactly
// this reason — it runs before any tenant exists to scope to.
@Module({
  controllers: [SignupController],
})
export class TenancyModule {}

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 import { HealthController } from "./health.controller";
 import { InternalModule } from "./internal/internal.module";
 import { MessagesModule } from "./messages/messages.module";
+import { TenancyModule } from "./tenancy/tenancy.module";
 import { LOGGER, apiLogger } from "./logger";
 import { ProtocolErrorFilter } from "./protocol-error.filter";
 import { RequestContextMiddleware } from "./request-context.middleware";
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@
 // provider (APP_FILTER) instead of wiring it in main.ts means every entry
 // point — including tests — gets the same error envelope for free.
 @Module({
-  imports: [MessagesModule, InternalModule],
+  imports: [MessagesModule, InternalModule, TenancyModule],
   controllers: [HealthController],
   providers: [
     { provide: LOGGER, useFactory: apiLogger },

RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID=…       # from the provider's app page
RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET=…   # runtime only — never a build argument
RELAY_OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE=http://localhost:4000
# optional, for GitHub Enterprise or a local stand-in:
RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_AUTHORIZE_URL=…
RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_TOKEN_URL=…
RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_USER_URL=…

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
 
import {
  profileSchema,
  providerErrorSchema,
  tokenResponseSchema,
} from "./oauth.schema";
import {
  STATE_COOKIE,
  clearStateCookie,
  mintState,
  readCookie,
  stateCookie,
  statesMatch,
} from "./state-cookie";
 
// Invariants 5 and 6 (chapter 3.1), in the Docker-free lane: the CSRF binding
// and the provider contract. Neither needs a database, and neither should wait
// for one — this is the lane a reader runs on every save (2.1's gate).
 
describe("the state binding (invariant 5)", () => {
  it("mints a value with enough entropy to be unguessable", () => {
    const a = mintState();
    const b = mintState();
    expect(a).toHaveLength(32); // 128 bits, hex
    expect(a).not.toBe(b);
  });
 
  it("refuses a callback whose state does not match the cookie", () => {
    const minted = mintState();
    // The attack this closes: an attacker starts the flow, takes the state
    // value, and feeds a victim the callback URL. The value is real, so a
    // server that only checked "is this well formed?" would accept it. What
    // the victim's browser does NOT have is the cookie.
    expect(statesMatch(minted, undefined)).toBe(false);
    expect(statesMatch(minted, mintState())).toBe(false);
    expect(statesMatch(undefined, minted)).toBe(false);
    expect(statesMatch("", "")).toBe(false);
    expect(statesMatch(minted, minted)).toBe(true);
  });
 
  it("does not leak length through an early return", () => {
    // A shorter or longer candidate is refused, not compared byte-for-byte.
    expect(statesMatch("abc", "abcd")).toBe(false);
  });
 
  it("sets the cookie so a script cannot read it and the provider can return through it", () => {
    const header = stateCookie("abc123", true);
    expect(header).toContain(`${STATE_COOKIE}=abc123`);
    expect(header).toContain("HttpOnly");
    // Lax, not Strict: the provider's redirect back IS a cross-site
    // navigation, and Strict would withhold the cookie exactly when it is
    // needed.
    expect(header).toContain("SameSite=Lax");
    expect(header).toContain("Path=/auth");
    expect(header).toContain("Secure");
  });
 
  it("omits Secure only when the base URL is plain http", () => {
    // A reader on localhost would never receive a Secure cookie over http,
    // and the flow would fail with nothing to point at.
    expect(stateCookie("abc", false)).not.toContain("Secure");
  });
 
  it("expires the cookie when clearing it", () => {
    expect(clearStateCookie(false)).toContain("Max-Age=0");
  });
 
  it("reads one cookie out of a header full of them", () => {
    const header = `other=1; ${STATE_COOKIE}=wanted; third=3`;
    expect(readCookie(header, STATE_COOKIE)).toBe("wanted");
    expect(readCookie(header, "missing")).toBeUndefined();
    expect(readCookie(undefined, STATE_COOKIE)).toBeUndefined();
    // A name that is a suffix of another must not match it.
    expect(readCookie(`x${STATE_COOKIE}=no`, STATE_COOKIE)).toBeUndefined();
  });
});
 
describe("the provider contract (invariant 6)", () => {
  it("recognises a provider's error body, which arrives with HTTP 200", () => {
    // GitHub answers a bad code with 200 and an error object. Parsing only the
    // success shape would read `access_token: undefined` as a token.
    const parsed = providerErrorSchema.safeParse({
      error: "bad_verification_code",
      error_description: "The code passed is incorrect or expired.",
    });
    expect(parsed.success).toBe(true);
  });
 
  it("rejects a token response with no token", () => {
    expect(
      tokenResponseSchema.safeParse({ token_type: "bearer" }).success,
    ).toBe(false);
    expect(tokenResponseSchema.safeParse({ access_token: "" }).success).toBe(
      false,
    );
    expect(
      tokenResponseSchema.safeParse({ access_token: "gho_x" }).success,
    ).toBe(true);
  });
 
  it("accepts an id whether the provider sends a number or a string", () => {
    // GitHub sends a number, Google a string. It is an opaque key here, so
    // both become a string rather than the api caring which provider it is.
    expect(profileSchema.parse({ id: 4711, login: "tuan" }).id).toBe("4711");
    expect(profileSchema.parse({ id: "4711", login: "tuan" }).id).toBe("4711");
  });
 
  it("tolerates a withheld email but not a missing id", () => {
    // FR-TEN-01: nothing beyond what the provider granted. A provider that
    // releases no email is normal, and identity does not depend on it.
    expect(
      profileSchema.safeParse({ id: 1, login: "tuan", email: null }).success,
    ).toBe(true);
    expect(profileSchema.safeParse({ login: "tuan" }).success).toBe(false);
  });
 
  it("rejects a profile whose email is not an email", () => {
    expect(
      profileSchema.safeParse({ id: 1, email: "not-an-email" }).success,
    ).toBe(false);
  });
});

import "reflect-metadata";
 
import { createServer } from "node:http";
import type { AddressInfo } from "node:net";
 
import { Test } from "@nestjs/testing";
import type { INestApplication } from "@nestjs/common";
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
 
import { AppModule } from "../app.module";
import { createDb, createPool } from "../db/client";
import { provisionOrganisation, Repository } from "../db/repository";
import { STATE_COOKIE } from "./state-cookie";
 
// Signup against the real database (chapter 3.1) — invariants 1–4 and 7.
//
// The OAuth provider is a stand-in served from this file: a token endpoint and
// a user endpoint, on a real port. Nothing about the flow is stubbed except who
// answers it, which is what keeps this lane offline and deterministic while
// still exercising the same code path a reader points at GitHub (research R8).
 
/** A provider that answers exactly what the test tells it to. */
function standInProvider(profile: unknown, tokenBody?: unknown) {
  const server = createServer((req, res) => {
    res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json");
    if (req.url?.startsWith("/token")) {
      res.end(JSON.stringify(tokenBody ?? { access_token: "gho_test" }));
      return;
    }
    res.end(JSON.stringify(profile));
  });
  return new Promise<{ port: number; close: () => Promise<void> }>(
    (resolve) => {
      server.listen(0, () => {
        const { port } = server.address() as AddressInfo;
        resolve({
          port,
          close: () => new Promise<void>((done) => server.close(() => done())),
        });
      });
    },
  );
}
 
describe("signup", () => {
  let app: INestApplication;
  let url: string;
  let db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>;
  let provider: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof standInProvider>>;
 
  beforeAll(async () => {
    db = createDb(createPool());
    provider = await standInProvider({
      id: 90210,
      login: "tuan",
      name: "Tuan",
    });
    // The provider's endpoints are configuration, so pointing them at the
    // stand-in is all the wiring this needs.
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID = "test-client";
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET = "test-secret";
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_TOKEN_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${provider.port}/token`;
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_USER_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${provider.port}/user`;
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_AUTHORIZE_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${provider.port}/authorize`;
    app = (
      await Test.createTestingModule({ imports: [AppModule] }).compile()
    ).createNestApplication({ logger: false });
    await app.listen(0);
    url = await app.getUrl();
  }, 60_000);
 
  afterAll(async () => {
    await app.close();
    await provider.close();
  });
 
  /** Walk the flow the way a browser would: start, keep the cookie, come back
   * with the state the server minted. */
  async function signUp(code = "code-1") {
    const start = await fetch(`${url}/auth/github/start`, {
      redirect: "manual",
    });
    const setCookie = start.headers.get("set-cookie") ?? "";
    const state = new URL(start.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get(
      "state",
    )!;
    const cookie = setCookie.split(";")[0]!;
    const res = await fetch(
      `${url}/auth/github/callback?code=${code}&state=${state}`,
      { headers: { cookie } },
    );
    return {
      status: res.status,
      body: (await res.json()) as {
        organisation: { id: string; name: string };
        application: { id: string; name: string };
        environment: { id: string; kind: string };
        created: boolean;
      },
    };
  }
 
  /** Run a block against a provider that reports a fresh identity. Signup is
   * idempotent PER IDENTITY, so a test that wants to observe a first signup
   * needs an identity no earlier test has used — otherwise it is asserting
   * against the suite's history rather than the behaviour. */
  async function withFreshIdentity<T>(
    accountId: string,
    fn: () => Promise<T>,
  ): Promise<T> {
    const fresh = await standInProvider({
      id: accountId,
      login: `u-${accountId}`,
    });
    const tokenUrl = process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_TOKEN_URL;
    const userUrl = process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_USER_URL;
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_TOKEN_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${fresh.port}/token`;
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_USER_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${fresh.port}/user`;
    try {
      return await fn();
    } finally {
      process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_TOKEN_URL = tokenUrl;
      process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_USER_URL = userUrl;
      await fresh.close();
    }
  }
 
  it("provisions the whole trio from one authentication (FR-TEN-01, FR-TEN-02)", async () => {
    const { status, body } = await withFreshIdentity(`trio-${Date.now()}`, () =>
      signUp(),
    );
    expect(status).toBe(200);
    expect(body.created).toBe(true);
    expect(body.organisation.id).toBeTruthy();
    expect(body.application.id).toBeTruthy();
    // FR-TEN-02 names the kind: development, and only development.
    expect(body.environment.kind).toBe("development");
 
    // Five rows, and the fifth is the one that says who owns it.
    const rows = await db.execute(
      `SELECT
         (SELECT count(*) FROM organisations WHERE id = '${body.organisation.id}') AS orgs,
         (SELECT count(*) FROM applications WHERE organisation_id = '${body.organisation.id}') AS apps,
         (SELECT count(*) FROM environments WHERE application_id = '${body.application.id}') AS envs,
         (SELECT count(*) FROM memberships WHERE organisation_id = '${body.organisation.id}' AND role = 'owner') AS owners`,
    );
    const counts = rows.rows[0] as Record<string, string>;
    expect(Number(counts.orgs)).toBe(1);
    expect(Number(counts.apps)).toBe(1);
    expect(Number(counts.envs)).toBe(1);
    expect(Number(counts.owners)).toBe(1);
  });
 
  it("writes the full set or nothing when provisioning fails (invariant 1)", async () => {
    const before = await db.execute(
      `SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM organisations`,
    );
    // Force a failure inside the transaction, after the organisation insert:
    // an organisation name that is fine and a provider value the CHECK
    // constraint refuses.
    await expect(
      provisionOrganisation(db, {
        provider: "not-a-provider",
        providerAccountId: "x",
        organisationName: "doomed org",
      }),
    ).rejects.toThrow();
    const after = await db.execute(
      `SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM organisations`,
    );
    // Nothing survived — no half-built tenant, which is the whole point of the
    // single transaction.
    expect((after.rows[0] as { n: number }).n).toBe(
      (before.rows[0] as { n: number }).n,
    );
    const orphan = await db.execute(
      `SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM organisations WHERE name = 'doomed org'`,
    );
    expect((orphan.rows[0] as { n: number }).n).toBe(0);
  });
 
  it("recognises a returning owner instead of creating a second organisation (invariant 2)", async () => {
    const accountId = `returning-${Date.now()}`;
    const { first, second } = await withFreshIdentity(accountId, async () => ({
      first: await signUp("code-a"),
      second: await signUp("code-b"),
    }));
    expect(first.body.created).toBe(true);
    expect(second.body.created).toBe(false);
    expect(second.body.organisation.id).toBe(first.body.organisation.id);
    expect(second.body.environment.id).toBe(first.body.environment.id);
    // One human, one owned organisation — the unique index decided, not a
    // read-then-write check.
    const owned = await db.execute(
      `SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM memberships m
         JOIN humans h ON h.id = m.human_id
        WHERE h.provider_account_id = '${accountId}' AND m.role = 'owner'`,
    );
    expect((owned.rows[0] as { n: number }).n).toBe(1);
  });
 
  it("refuses a third environment for one application (invariant 3, FR-TEN-04)", async () => {
    // Its own identity, so its own application: this test adds a production
    // environment, and the database is not truncated between runs — reusing a
    // shared identity would hand the second run an application that already
    // had one (the per-suite-environment lesson from 2.1, one level up).
    const { body } = await withFreshIdentity(`envcap-${Date.now()}`, () =>
      signUp("code-c"),
    );
    const appId = body.application.id;
    // Production is legal — two environments are what FR-TEN-04 allows.
    await db.execute(
      `INSERT INTO environments (id, application_id, kind, signing_secret)
       VALUES (gen_random_uuid(), '${appId}', 'production', gen_random_uuid())`,
    );
    // A second development environment is not, and the database is what says
    // so — no application-level guard to lose a race to.
    await expect(
      db.execute(
        `INSERT INTO environments (id, application_id, kind, signing_secret)
         VALUES (gen_random_uuid(), '${appId}', 'development', gen_random_uuid())`,
      ),
    ).rejects.toThrow();
    const kinds = await db.execute(
      `SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM environments WHERE application_id = '${appId}'`,
    );
    expect((kinds.rows[0] as { n: number }).n).toBe(2);
  });
 
  it("keeps two organisations blind to each other (invariant 4, FR-TEN-05)", async () => {
    // Two tenants, each with a message of its own.
    const a = await provisionOrganisation(db, {
      provider: "github",
      providerAccountId: `iso-a-${Date.now()}`,
      organisationName: "org a",
    });
    const b = await provisionOrganisation(db, {
      provider: "github",
      providerAccountId: `iso-b-${Date.now()}`,
      organisationName: "org b",
    });
    const repoA = new Repository(db, a.environment.id);
    const repoB = new Repository(db, b.environment.id);
    const userA = await repoA.createUser("a-user");
    const channelA = await repoA.createChannel("a-channel", "public");
    await repoA.addMember(channelA.id, userA.id);
    await repoA.sendMessage(channelA.id, {
      text: "a secret",
      userId: userA.id,
    });
 
    // B asks for A's channel by id and gets nothing — not an error that would
    // confirm it exists (FR-TEN-05).
    expect(await repoB.listMessages(channelA.id, { limit: 10 })).toEqual([]);
    expect(await repoB.getChannelByExternalId("a-channel")).toBeNull();
    expect(await repoB.listChannels()).toEqual([]);
    // And A still sees its own.
    expect((await repoA.listMessages(channelA.id, { limit: 10 })).length).toBe(
      1,
    );
  });
 
  it("exposes provisioning nowhere but the signup path (invariant 7, spec FR-011)", async () => {
    // The admin surface is a module-free function: it is not a provider, so no
    // controller can be handed it by injection, and the tenancy module declares
    // no providers at all. What a reader can check from outside is that no
    // route creates a tenant on request.
    for (const path of [
      "/v1/channels/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000/messages",
      "/internal/memberships",
      "/internal/backfill",
    ]) {
      const res = await fetch(`${url}${path}`, {
        method: "POST",
        headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
        body: "{}",
      });
      // Whatever these answer, it is never "here is a new tenant".
      expect(res.status).not.toBe(200);
      const text = await res.text();
      expect(text).not.toContain("organisation");
    }
    const before = await db.execute(
      `SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM organisations`,
    );
    await fetch(`${url}/internal/memberships`, {
      headers: {
        "x-relay-environment": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
      },
    });
    const after = await db.execute(
      `SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM organisations`,
    );
    expect((after.rows[0] as { n: number }).n).toBe(
      (before.rows[0] as { n: number }).n,
    );
  });
 
  it("refuses a callback whose state does not match the cookie (invariant 5, over HTTP)", async () => {
    const start = await fetch(`${url}/auth/github/start`, {
      redirect: "manual",
    });
    const cookie = (start.headers.get("set-cookie") ?? "").split(";")[0]!;
    // An attacker's state value with the victim's cookie: refused.
    const res = await fetch(
      `${url}/auth/github/callback?code=c&state=deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef`,
      { headers: { cookie } },
    );
    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
    // And with no cookie at all.
    const state = new URL(start.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get(
      "state",
    )!;
    const naked = await fetch(
      `${url}/auth/github/callback?code=c&state=${state}`,
    );
    expect(naked.status).toBe(400);
    expect(cookie).toContain(STATE_COOKIE);
  });
 
  it("answers 502 when the provider breaks its contract (invariant 6, over HTTP)", async () => {
    const broken = await standInProvider({ login: "no-id-here" });
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_USER_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${broken.port}/user`;
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_TOKEN_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${broken.port}/token`;
    const start = await fetch(`${url}/auth/github/start`, {
      redirect: "manual",
    });
    const cookie = (start.headers.get("set-cookie") ?? "").split(";")[0]!;
    const state = new URL(start.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get(
      "state",
    )!;
    const res = await fetch(
      `${url}/auth/github/callback?code=c&state=${state}`,
      { headers: { cookie } },
    );
    // 502, not 400: the caller did nothing wrong.
    expect(res.status).toBe(502);
    await broken.close();
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_USER_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${provider.port}/user`;
    process.env.RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_TOKEN_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${provider.port}/token`;
  });
});

✓ signup > provisions the whole trio from one authentication (FR-TEN-01, FR-TEN-02)
✓ signup > writes the full set or nothing when provisioning fails (invariant 1)
✓ signup > recognises a returning owner instead of creating a second organisation (invariant 2)
✓ signup > refuses a third environment for one application (invariant 3, FR-TEN-04)
✓ signup > keeps two organisations blind to each other (invariant 4, FR-TEN-05)
✓ signup > exposes provisioning nowhere but the signup path (invariant 7, spec FR-011)
✓ signup > refuses a callback whose state does not match the cookie (invariant 5, over HTTP)
✓ signup > answers 502 when the provider breaks its contract (invariant 6, over HTTP)

// Chapter 3.1's walk: sign up, and then sign up again.
//
// The first run creates an organisation, an application and a development
// environment from one authentication. The second run, with the same provider
// identity, creates nothing and hands back what already exists. Both are the
// same code path a reader points at GitHub — only the provider is local, so
// the walk needs no account and no network (research R8).
//
// The stand-in listens on a FIXED port, because the api has to be told where
// the provider is before it starts:
//
//   PROVIDER=http://127.0.0.1:4199
//   RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID=walk \
//   RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET=walk \
//   RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_TOKEN_URL=$PROVIDER/token \
//   RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_USER_URL=$PROVIDER/user \
//   RELAY_OAUTH_GITHUB_AUTHORIZE_URL=$PROVIDER/authorize \
//     node services/api/dist/main.js &
//   node scripts/signup-walk.mjs
import { createServer } from "node:http";
 
const API = process.env.RELAY_API_URL ?? "http://127.0.0.1:4000";
 
/** A stand-in GitHub: one token endpoint, one profile endpoint. */
const ACCOUNT_ID = process.env.RELAY_WALK_ACCOUNT ?? `walk-${Date.now()}`;
const provider = createServer((req, res) => {
  res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json");
  if (req.url?.startsWith("/token")) {
    res.end(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "gho_walk", token_type: "bearer" }));
    return;
  }
  res.end(JSON.stringify({ id: ACCOUNT_ID, login: "tuan", name: "Tuan" }));
});
const PROVIDER_PORT = Number(process.env.RELAY_WALK_PROVIDER_PORT ?? 4199);
await new Promise((resolve) => provider.listen(PROVIDER_PORT, resolve));
console.log(`stand-in provider on ${PROVIDER_PORT}, account ${ACCOUNT_ID}\n`);
 
/** Walk the flow the way a browser does: follow the redirect, keep the cookie,
 * come back with the state the server minted. */
async function signUp(label) {
  const start = await fetch(`${API}/auth/github/start`, { redirect: "manual" });
  const location = start.headers.get("location");
  const cookie = (start.headers.get("set-cookie") ?? "").split(";")[0];
  console.log(`${label} → GET /auth/github/start`);
  console.log(`    ${start.status} redirect to ${location?.slice(0, 60)}…`);
  console.log(`    cookie: ${cookie?.split("=")[0]} (HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax)`);
 
  const state = new URL(location).searchParams.get("state");
  const res = await fetch(
    `${API}/auth/github/callback?code=walk-code&state=${state}`,
    { headers: { cookie } },
  );
  const body = await res.json();
  console.log(`${label} → GET /auth/github/callback`);
  console.log(`    ${res.status} created=${body.created}`);
  console.log(`    organisation ${body.organisation?.id}`);
  console.log(`    application  ${body.application?.id}`);
  console.log(
    `    environment  ${body.environment?.id} (${body.environment?.kind})\n`,
  );
  return body;
}
 
const first = await signUp("first authentication ");
const second = await signUp("second authentication");
 
console.log(
  first.organisation?.id === second.organisation?.id
    ? "same organisation both times — one identity, one workspace (FR-TEN-01/02)"
    : "DIFFERENT organisations — signup is not idempotent, which is a bug",
);
 
// And the state binding, refused: the value is real, the cookie is not sent.
const start = await fetch(`${API}/auth/github/start`, { redirect: "manual" });
const stolen = new URL(start.headers.get("location")).searchParams.get("state");
const forged = await fetch(
  `${API}/auth/github/callback?code=walk-code&state=${stolen}`,
);
console.log(
  `\nsame state, no cookie: ${forged.status} — the binding is what makes state work`,
);
 
provider.close();
process.exit(0);

stand-in provider on 4199, account walk-1786186996322
 
first authentication  → GET /auth/github/start
    302 redirect to http://127.0.0.1:4199/authorize?client_id=walk&redirect_uri=…
    cookie: relay_oauth_state (HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax)
first authentication  → GET /auth/github/callback
    200 created=true
    organisation 63de1195-4f28-4c46-a3bd-85ebcb6f8869
    application  2eb17d73-72f0-4fb6-bf5c-dcb9808abcab
    environment  dbd313f4-5818-480d-bf5a-b5a79cf25cdc (development)
 
second authentication → GET /auth/github/start
    302 redirect to http://127.0.0.1:4199/authorize?client_id=walk&redirect_uri=…
    cookie: relay_oauth_state (HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax)
second authentication → GET /auth/github/callback
    200 created=false
    organisation 63de1195-4f28-4c46-a3bd-85ebcb6f8869
    application  2eb17d73-72f0-4fb6-bf5c-dcb9808abcab
    environment  dbd313f4-5818-480d-bf5a-b5a79cf25cdc (development)
 
same organisation both times — one identity, one workspace (FR-TEN-01/02)
 
same state, no cookie: 400 — the binding is what makes state work